

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 039256 TOSEC 040076

61

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APPROVED BY P:JJSISCO

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 039256 TOSEC 040076

NODIS

CHEROKEE, FOR SAUNDERS FROM SISCO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, US, XF

SUBJECT: TRANSMISSION OF STRATEGY PAPER RE NEXT STEPS IN  
MIDDLE EAST

1. I HAVE REVIEWED ROY'S DRAFT OF THE STRATEGY PAPER.  
FOLLOWING CHANGES SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO YOUR COPY AND  
PAPER SHOULD THEN BE PUT FORWARD TO SECRETARY.

2. A. PAGE 2, FIRST FULL PARAGRAPH, SECOND LINE: AFTER  
"WHICH" AND BEFORE "MIGHT NECESSITATE" INSERT PHRASE  
"WOULD GENERATE FRICTION IN US-ISRAELI RELATIONS AND".

B. PAGE 2, FIRST FULL PARAGRAPH, SIXTH LINE: REVISE TO  
READ AS FOLLOWS: "POSED IN THAT TIME FRAME THE CHANCES  
ARE REMOTE INDEED OF AVOIDING A NEW OUTBREAK OF HOSTILI-  
TIES, A RENEWED OIL EMBARGO AND AN UPSURGE IN ARAB RADI-  
CALISM AND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD GENERALLY,  
LEADING INTER ALIA TO THE DOWNFALL OR ALIENATION OF SADAT  
AND TO SERIOUS DAMAGE TO OUR RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA."

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3. REVISE PAGE 3 TO READ AS FOLLOWS: "PROFOUNDLY UNHELP-  
FUL EFFECTS ON THE WILLINGNESS OF POLITICAL OPINION IN  
ISRAEL AND IN THE UNITED STATES TO SUPPORT MOVES TOWARD  
PEACE WITH THE ARABS. IT WILL ALSO IMPACT ON RELATIONS

WITH OUR NATO ALLIES AS THEY POSITION THEMSELVES TO MINIMIZE THE POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS EFFECT ON THEMSELVES OF ANOTHER ARAB-ISRAELI WAR AND OIL EMBARGO BY MOVING AWAY FROM THE US AND ISRAEL, CLOSER TO THE ARABS AND THE USSR.

UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, ARAB INCENTIVES FOR RADICALISM AND CONFLICT WOULD BE REINFORCED. THE RESULTANT CONFLICT--NO MATTER WHO STARTS IT--WOULD FIND EVEN LESS SUPPORT THAN IN 1973, IN FACE OF MORE DETERMINED, RADICALIZED ARAB LEADERSHIP. THE RESULT WOULD BE MORE BLOODY AND DESTRUCTIVE THAN EVER BEFORE. IT WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY END IN A COSTLY VICTORY FOR ISRAEL AND A DEVASTATED BUT RADICAL AND IMPLACABLY ANTI-AMERICAN ARAB WORLD INCLUDING SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN AND OTHERS IN THE PERIPHERY, AS WELL AS EGYPT AND SYRIA.

WHAT 1976 HOLDS IN THE EVENT OF STALEMATE

IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EVIDENT MOVES TOWARD PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM IN 1976, THE FOLLOWING EVENTS AND TRENDS ARE LIKELY TO OCCUR, WHICH WILL MAKE 1977 EVEN MORE UNPROMISING.

INTERNATIONAL FORA AND THE US

THERE WILL BE INCREASING PRESSURES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA TO ISOLATE ISRAEL--AND THEREBY MARTYR ISRAEL IN US OPINION--AND THE US WILL BE FACED WITH UNPLEASANT CHOICES OF APPEARING TO ALTER OUR STATED POLICIES ON SUCH THINGS AS NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO UNDER ARAB/SOVIET PRESSURE, OR APPEARING AS ISRAEL'S SOLE AND UNQUESTIONING SUPPORTER. UNLESS THERE IS VISIBLE DIPLOMATIC MOVEMENT TO WHICH IT CAN POINT AS PORTRAYING THE SUCCESS OF ITS POLICIES, SYRIA'S STRATEGY WILL VERY PROBABLY BE AKIN TO THAT WHICH IT FOLLOWED IN THE SUMMER AND FALL OF 1975: LAUNCH CAMPAIGNS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO CONDEMN, ISOLATE AND EXPEL ISRAEL IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN THE IMAGE OF  
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SYRIAN "LEADERSHIP" WITHOUT HAVING TO GO TO WAR. THE APPLICATION OF THIS STRATEGY TO THE RENEWAL OF THE UNDOF MANDATE ON MAY 30 WILL BE TO CONFRONT US WITH A DISTASTEFUL RESOLUTION EXTENDING THE MANDATE IN RETURN FOR GRANTING FURTHER RECOGNITION TO THE PLO, CONDEMNING ISRAEL FOR NOT IMPLEMENTING THE GA RESOLUTIONS, PERHAPS EXPANDING THE FRAMEWORK OF RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338; AND TRYING TO USE THE "UNITING FOR PEACE" RESOLUTION TO BRING ABOUT AN EMERGENCY GA SESSION TO CALL FOR STRONG ANTI-ISRAEL ACTION IF THE USG CASTS A VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. SYRIA MAY WELL PROVE LESS INTERESTED..."

4. A. PAGE 4, FIRST FULL PARAGRAPH, FOURTH LINE: INSERT

WORD "ALSO" AFTER "GROUPS ARE" AND BEFORE "SPONSORING".

B. PAGE 4, SECOND FULL PARA, THIRD LINE: INSERT WORD  
"VISIBLE" AFTER WORDS "IF SOME" AND BEFORE "NEGOTIATING".

5. A. PAGE 5: DELETE FIRST SENTENCE AT TOP OF PAGE.

B. PAGE 5: ADD FOLLOWING SENTENCE AT END OF FIRST PARAGRAPH: "AN ESCALATING CYCLE OF HOSTILE INTERACTION BETWEEN US AND ARAB ATTITUDES COULD COME INTO BEING WHICH COULD CARRY FUNDAMENTAL US-ARAB RELATIONS PAST THE POINT OF NO RETURN, ACCELERATING THE PACE OF ARAB RADICALIZATION AND LEADING TO EVENTUAL COMBAT."

C. PAGE 5: ADD HEADING "ARAB WORLD" AFTER FIRST PARA AND BEFORE SECOND.

D. PAGE 5, SECOND PARA, FIFTH LINE: REVISE TO READ AS FOLLOWS: "OUR OWN CREDIBILITY WITH SADAT AS WELL AS THE OTHER ARABS COULD BE DESTROYED IF WE APPEAR TO BE LOCKED INTO AN ISRAELI POLICY OF DELIBERATE STALEMATE DESPITE OUR ASSERTIONS THAT WE WILL NOT TOLERATE IT."

6. PAGE 6: REVISE ENTIRE PAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"IF SADAT SHOULD CONCLUDE THAT WE DELUDED HIM, THE CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR WHOLE MIDDLE EAST POLICY WOULD BE GRAVE INDEED. A MAJOR POTENTIAL PROBLEM IS THAT HIS PERSONAL  
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IDENTIFICATION WITH A STRONG PRO-AMERICAN EGYPTIAN POSTURE AND WITH THE SINAI II AGREEMENT HAS BROUGHT HIM AND EGYPT UNDER VICIOUS ATTACK WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD, AND AT THE SAME TIME HAS GIVEN AMMUNITION TO EGYPTIAN DISSIDENTS IN A COUNTRY WHERE POLITICAL DISCONTENT IS AGGRAVATED BY DEEPENING LOWER-CLASS POVERTY AND ECONOMIC MALAISE. IF LACK OF DIPLOMATIC MOVEMENT MAKES OF SADAT'S POLICIES AN ALBATROSS AROUND HIS NECK, HE WILL HAVE TO SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE NEED TO MOVE AWAY FROM HIS ADHERENCE TO BOTH THE US AND THE SINAI AGREEMENT. SADAT WOULD HAVE LITTLE OPTION IN THE SHORT TERM BUT TO TRY AND FORGE A NEW HARD-LINE ARAB COALITION AND TURN BACK TOWARD THE USSR IN ORDER TO PRESERVE SOMETHING OF EGYPT'S POSITION AND INFLUENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD WHILE PREPARING FOR ANOTHER ROUND OF HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL. THE RIVALRY BETWEEN SYRIA AND EGYPT COULD EITHER CONTINUE FOR QUITE A WHILE (WITH EGYPT PROBABLY SEEKING AN ALLIANCE WITH IRAQ AND POSSIBLY LIBYA--MOVING IN A STEADILY MORE ANTI-US ANTI-ISRAELI DIRECTION AS EACH TRIED TO OUTBID THE OTHER--OR THE TWO COULD RE-ESTABLISH A WORKING RELATIONSHIP IN THE CONTEXT OF A BROADER ARAB MOVEMENT PATTERNED ON THE 1973 ARAB PREPARATIONS FOR HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL.

IN EITHER CASE, THE FEW REMAINING ARAB MODERATES WOULD BE OBLIGED TO SHIFT THEIR OWN POLICIES TO KEEP FROM BEING SWEEPED AWAY BY THE ARAB MAIN STREAM. THE SAUDIS WOULD ALSO BE EXTREMELY BITTER AT THE UNITED STATES FOR HAVING "BETRAYED" THEM BY NOT MAKING GOOD ON OUR SUPPORT FOR SADAT'S MODERATE POLICIES (THEREBY PROTECTING THE SAUDIS FROM THE USSR AND ARAB RADICALISM) AND ON OUR PROMISES TO THE SAUDIS ABOUT MOVEMENT IN NEGOTIATIONS IN 1976, AS WELL AS FOR WHAT THEY SEE AS AN ORCHESTRATED ANTI-SAUDI CAMPAIGN BY THE US MEDIA AND CONGRESS. THE SIGNS OF SLIPPAGE IN OUR POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD ARE ALREADY EVIDENT IN SAUDI LEADERSHIP ATTITUDES TOWARD US BUSINESS INTERESTS IN THE KINGDOM. A FURTHER DETERIORATION IN OUR IMPORTANT ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA (E.G. RECYCLING PETRO-DOLLARS, OIL PRICES, OIL AVAILABILITY, MONETARY POLICY) AND OTHER ARAB OIL PRODUCERS MUST BE EXPECTED IF THE SITUATION CONTINUES TO STAGNATE.

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AT SOME POINT SADAT WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER HOW LONG HE CAN TOLERATE THE CONTINUAL ARAB CRITICISM OF SINAI II AND HIS PRO-AMERICAN POLICY, AND IT CANNOT BE EXCLUDED THAT HE WOULD DO SOMETHING TO PURPOSELY VIOLATE THE SINAI AGREEMENT IN A WAY THAT WOULD NOT AUTOMATICALLY BRING WAR BUT WOULD CALL INTO QUESTION THE WHOLE BASIS FOR THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH AND MAKE FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS MUCH MORE UNLIKELY. FOR EXAMPLE, HE MIGHT ANNOUNCE THAT BECAUSE OF ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE, AND, BY IMPLICATION, US FAILURE TO PRODUCE MOVEMENT, EGYPT WOULD NO LONGER PERMIT PASSAGE OF ISRAELI CARGOES THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL. SUCH A STEP WOULD LEAVE THE ISRAELIS AND OURSELVES WITH LITTLE WE COULD DO ABOUT IT, BUT THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE REASON TO REFUSE FURTHER NEGOTIATING EFFORTS ON THE BASIS THAT ARAB AGREEMENTS ARE WORTHLESS. SADAT'S IMAGE IN THIS COUNTRY WOULD ALSO BE GREATLY DIMINISHED AND SUPPORT FOR OUR CLOSE RELATIONS WITH HIM WOULD DECLINE GREATLY. HE COULD ALSO DECIDE NOT TO RENEW THE UNEF MANDATE, ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD BE MORE DANGEROUS VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL AND SADAT WOULD BE VERY HESITANT TO REPEAT NASSER'S PERFORMANCE OF 1967."

7. A. PAGE 7: REVISE FIRST PARA TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"EVEN IF KNOWN FLASH-POINTS, SUCH AS THE UNDOF AND UNEF MANDATE RENEWALS, ARE PASSED SAFELY, THE INCREASING ARAB RADICALISM AND HOSTILITY TOWARD ISRAEL WOULD INCREASE THE THREAT OF HOSTILITIES AT AN UNEXPECTED TIME IN AN UNEXPECTED SITUATION. GUERRILLA RAIDS ACROSS THE SYRIAN OR LEBANESE BORDERS WITH ISRAEL COULD BEGIN AT ANY TIME WITH THE DANGER OF EITHER ACCIDENTAL OR DELIBERATE ISRAELI

OVER-REACTION LEADING TO AN ESCALATING CYCLE OF VIOLENCE  
AND, EVENTUALLY, ALL-OUT HOSTILITIES."

B. PAGE 7: ADD SUBHEADING "ISRAEL" BETWEEN FIRST AND  
SECOND PARAS.

8. PAGE 8: INSERT FOLLOWING SENTENCE AFTER SENTENCE  
ENDING IN WORD "SOUGHT". "MOREOVER, US ARMS TRANSFERS--  
WHICH BY THAT POINT WILL HAVE AMOUNTED TO MORE THAN DOLS  
SEVEN BILLION OF SOPHISTICATED POWERFUL WEAPONRY SINCE THE  
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OCTOBER WAR--WILL HAVE PUT ISRAEL IN A POSITION WHERE A  
UAR WHICH WOULD CLEARLY DEVASTATE ITS ADVERSARIES AND  
REVERSE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SETBACK OF 1973 WOULD, TO MANY  
ISRAELIS, BE A PREFERABLE ALTERNATIVE TO FURTHER TERRITORIAL  
CONCESSIONS LEADING TO AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE."

9. PAGE 14, FIRST PARA, LINE FIFTEEN: REVISE SENTENCE TO  
READ AS FOLLOWS: "THE LIKUD TRIED TO BLOCK AVINERI'S  
APPOINTMENT, AS DID SOME IN LABOR, BUT THE CABINET APPROVED  
HIM."

10. PAGE 17: DELETE ENTIRE SENTENCE BEGINNING WITH "BUT  
AN EFFORT TO HEAD THEM OFF..." AND SUBSTITUTE FOLLOWING:

"BUT AN EFFORT TO TRY AND REGAIN ASAD'S COOPERATION IN THE  
NEGOTIATING PROCESS BY MAKING GOOD ON OUR PROMISE TO DO  
SOMETHING FOR SYRIA IS DEFINITELY WORTH A TRY. WE CANNOT  
EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT HIS RELATIVE PRAGMATISM AND  
MODERATION WILL COME TO THE FORE IF HE HAS SOMETHING WITH  
WHICH TO DEFEND HIMSELF AGAINST HIS INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL  
CRITICS. MOREOVER, THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANOTHER ROUND IN  
THE UN IN MAY-JUNE COULD BE DEVASTATING TO FUTURE NEGOTIAT-  
ING INITIATIVES AND THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE ENTIRE  
MIDDLE EAST."

11. A. PAGE 18, FIRST LINE, STRIKE WORDS "IN ISRAEL" AND  
REVISE TO READ "THE ISRAELI LABOR PARTY'S..."

B. UNDERLINE ENTIRE SENTENCE MID-PAGE BEGINNING WITH WORDS  
"THESE CONSIDERATIONS SUGGEST THAT..."

12. A. PAGE 20, LAST SENTENCE OF FIRST PARA BECOMES NEW  
PARA READING AS FOLLOWS: "FOR REASONS SET FORTH EARLIER

IN THIS PAPER, HOWEVER, IT IS EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL THAT SUCH  
A COURSE OF ACTION ON OUR PART WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO  
KEEP EVENTS UNDER OUR CONTROL. MOREOVER, THIS WOULD RUN  
DIRECTLY COUNTER TO THE REPEATED PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATE-  
MENTS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND PRESIDENT FORD THAT WE  
WILL NOT ACCEPT STALEMATE AND ACQUIESCE IN ISRAELI NON-

MOVEMENT DURING 1976 AS WE DID IN 1972 AND 73. SADAT,  
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HUSSEIN, ASAD AND THE SAUDIS WOULD CONCLUDE--AS THEY DID  
IN 1972-73--THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICAL  
PROCESS HAVE BECOME LIABILITIES RATHER THAN ASSETS IN THE  
ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE. THE DETERIORATION OF ARAB BILATERAL  
RELATIONS WITH THE US, THE GROWTH OF SOVIET INFLUENCE AND  
THE PACE OF LONG-TERM RADICALIZATION WOULD BE GIVEN GREAT  
IMPETUS--EVEN THOUGH THE RESULTS MIGHT NOT BE IMMEDIATELY  
APPARENT AND THE ERUPTION OF A NEW ROUND OF HOSTILITIES  
AND/OR OIL EMBARGO MIGHT WELL NOT COME DURING 1976 OR EVEN  
1977." THIS SHOULD BE INSERTED BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND  
PARA.

13. A. PAGE 22, END OF PARTIAL SENTENCE AT TOP OF PAGE,  
INSERT PHRASE "AND THAT THE VIEWS OF THE PALESTINIAN  
PEOPLE WOULD BE CONSIDERED."

B. PAGE 22, SECOND FULL PARA, THIRD LINE, INSERT WORDS  
"MORE OF" AFTER "RIGHTS BECAME" AND BEFORE "AN INTRA-ARAB  
ISSUE."

14. A. PAGE 24, BEFORE FIRST FULL PARAGRAPH, INSERT  
FOLLOWING PARA: "TELLING THE ISRAELIS THIS WOULD ALSO BE  
IMPORTANT IN BUILDING A RECORD WE CAN DEFEND SHOULD ISRAEL  
REJECT OUR APPROACH, LEAVING US WITH NO ALTERNATIVE BUT  
TO MOVE INDEPENDENTLY TO SET FORTH A BALANCED US POSITION  
WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF ISRAELI STONE-  
WALLING ON OUR INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD."

B. PAGE 24, FIRST FULL PARA, FIFTH LINE, INSERT WORD  
"SUBSTANTIAL" AFTER "TO EXTRACT A" AND BEFORE "POLITICAL  
PRICE".

C. PAGE 24, FIRST FULL PARA, EIGHTH LINE, INSERT WORD  
"FUTURE" AFTER "TO CONTINUE GENEROUS" AND BEFORE "MILI-  
TARY". DELETE REST OF SENTENCE AFTER WORDS "FINANCIAL  
SUPPORT".

15. ADD FOLLOWING SECTION AT END OF PAPER.

"WALDHEIM'S GAMBIT

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AS YOU KNOW, UN SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM HAS THE IDEA OF  
CONVOKING A MEETING IN GENEVA OF HIS REPRESENTATIVE AND  
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE GENEVA  
CONFERENCE AS A MEANS OF TRYING TO BREAK THE EXISTING

DEADLOCK OVER ATTENDANCE BY THE PLO AT EITHER THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OR A PREPARATORY CONFERENCE. WALDHEIM RAISED THE IDEA WITH PRIME MINISTER RABIN DURING THE LATTER'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES AND RABIN APPARENTLY SAW NO OBJECTION TO SUCH A MEETING, PROVIDED IT TOOK PLACE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL LETTER OF INVITATION FOR THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND DID NOT INCLUDE ANY NEW PARTICIPANTS. WALDHEIM'S IDEA IS TO CONVENE THE MINI-MEETING ON A DELIBERATELY AMBIGUOUS BASIS, SIMPLY ASKING THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, THE USSR AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO HAVE INDIVIDUAL CONTACTS WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN, ISRAEL AND THE PLO (WHICH HAS AN OFFICE IN GENEVA) AND THEN DISCUSSING TOGETHER THE RESULTS OF THESE CONTACTS. IN THIS WAY, THE ARABS COULD CLAIM THAT THE PLO WAS BEING BROUGHT INTO THE PROCESS YET ISRAEL COULD CLAIM THE GENEVA FRAMEWORK HAS NOT BEEN CHANGED AND WOULD NOT BE CONFRONTED WITH THE NEED TO TAKE A POSITION AT THIS TIME ON PLO PARTICIPATION. NOR WOULD THE US NEED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE PLO SINCE WE COULD OBTAIN THEIR VIEWS THROUGH THE ARAB REPRESENTATIVES OR THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE USSR AND THE ARABS WOULD FIND SUCH A HALF-WAY HOUSE ACCEPTABLE, OR THAT ISRAEL COULD BE INDUCED TO AGREE TO EVEN SUCH INDIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF THE PLO (SURELY A SINE QUA NON IF THERE IS TO BE ANY HOPE OF USSR AND ARAB AGREEMENT TO THE IDEA). HOWEVER, THE IDEA DOES OFFER A POSSIBLE MEANS OF SURMOUNTING THE PRESENT COMPLETE IMPASSE OR RECONVENING GENEVA OR HOLDING A PREPARATORY CONFERENCE. UNDER SECRETARY GUYER WILL BE EXPLORING THE IDEA DURING HIS TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST AS WALDHEIM'S REPRESENTATIVE (FEBRUARY 21 TO MARCH 4 OR 5). IF THERE IS ANY SIGN OF A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE USSR AND THE ARABS WE MAY WISH TO SUPPORT IT, AT LEAST AS AN INTERIM MEASURE. IT WOULD NOT CONFLICT WITH THE MORE FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIC MOVES WHICH WERE RAISED WITH RABIN, AND IT COULD GIVE ASAD THE SORT OF FACE-SAVING DEVICE

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HE NEEDS TO RENEW UNDOF." INGERSOLL

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## Message Attributes

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